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TORT CHOICE OF LAW AND INTERNATIONAL 
FUNDAMENTAL NORMS: A CASE STUDY OF CANADA 






This article considers the tort choice of law rules in Canada and the United States – two highly 
internationalist societies with similar legal traditions but whose choice of law rules vary dramatically. 
The two jurisdictions are also known for their constant reference to international law in the 
resolution of domestic disputes. Moreover, Canada embodies both the common law and the civil law 
traditions. The aim here is twofold. The first is to evaluate the suitability of their choice of law rules 
for addressing cases alleging violations of international fundamental norms. The second is to see what 
other jurisdictions can learn from the experiences of these two jurisdictions in their adjudication of 
international norms.  
This article makes these principal findings. While none of the two jurisdictions has a choice 
of law rule specially attuned to deal with violations of international norms, the operative rule in 
Canada contains reasonable flexibility to meet the needs of such cases. It finds within the assortment 
of tort choice of law rules in the US, some rules that at least mention the interests of the 
international community as an important consideration in the choice of applicable law, and that US 
courts already do look to international law to determine certain substantive issues arising in cases 
brought under the Alien Tort Statute. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The growing recognition of certain norms as fundamental to the interests of the 
international community has raised questions about the application of traditional tort 
choice of law rules in national courts. The times when international legal rules were 
thought to affect only relations among States have since passed. Particularly with the 
recognition of human rights as a subject of international law, individuals can now, 
subject to certain legal constraints, seek the enforcement of internationally protected 
rights in domestic courts. Choice of law scholarship, however, is negligible on the 
role of the interests of the international community in the resolution of choice of law 
disputes engaging norms of fundamental concern to the international community. 
The dilemma in such cases is how national courts, applying domestic tort choice of 
law theories, can incorporate the interests of the international community to advance 
the prohibition of the violation of such international fundamental norms. In an age 
where business and social activities ignore inter-State boundaries, a consideration of 
how the existing rules in some jurisdictions may be or have been applied to deal with 
such situations is valuable, even if only so as to provide guidance to other 
jurisdictions.1 
                                                
* Fellow, Canadian Centre for International Justice; PhD (University of British Columbia); LLM 
(University of Calgary); LLB (Imo State University). 
1 As long ago as 1952, Professors Cheetam and Reese believed that ‘the smooth functioning of the 
interstate and international systems in private law matters should be the basic consideration in the 
decision of every choice of law case.’ Elliot E Cheatham & Willis LM Reese, ‘Choice of the 
Applicable Law’ (1952) 52 Colum L Rev 959, 962. 
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This article considers the tort choice of law rules in Canada and the United 
States – two highly internationalist societies with similar legal traditions but whose 
choice of law rules vary dramatically. The two jurisdictions are also known for their 
constant reference to international law in the resolution of domestic disputes. 
Moreover, Canada embodies both the common law and the civil law traditions. The 
aim here is twofold. The first is to evaluate the suitability of their choice of law rules 
for addressing cases alleging violations of international fundamental norms. The 
second is to see what other jurisdictions can learn from the experiences of these two 
jurisdictions in their adjudication of international norms.  
This article makes these principal findings. While none of the two 
jurisdictions has a choice of law rule specially attuned to deal with violations of 
international norms, the operative rule in Canada contains reasonable flexibility to 
meet the needs of such cases. It finds within the assortment of tort choice of law 
rules in the US, some rules that at least mention the interests of the international 
community as an important consideration in the choice of applicable law, and that 
US courts already do look to international law to determine certain substantive issues 
arising in cases brought under the Alien Tort Statute.2  
 
II. CANADA 
Tort choice of law in Canada is governed by the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
decision in Tolofson v Jensen and Gagnon v Lucas3 – two companion cases that presented 
similar fact-situations and similar questions of law. The Supreme Court issued a 
consolidated decision covering both cases. Put simply, the plaintiffs in both cases 
were residents of province A. They were both passengers in cars registered and 
insured in Province A. The drivers of those cars were also residents of province A. 
The passengers were injured in an accident that occurred in Province B. The drivers 
of the other cars were residents of province B and their cars were registered in 
Province B. In the one case, liability was covered by an insurance contract made in 
Province B. In the other case, it was covered under the terms of Province B’s ‘no 
fault’ insurance scheme. The plaintiffs brought suit in Province A against the two 
drivers. The question then was which Province’s law should govern. Was it that of 
province A or that of Province B? The Supreme Court held that the lex loci delicti rule 
governed, subject to a flexible exception. 
La Forest J, who penned the decision for the Court, justified the application 
of the lex loci. He stressed that the lex loci rule has the merit of ‘certainty, ease of 
application and predictability.’4 It would meet the natural expectations of the parties. 
For in the normal course of events people would expect their actions to be governed 
by the law of the place where the actions took place and that the legal consequences 
of those actions be defined by the same law.5 La Forest J thus found the application 
of the lex loci rule ‘axiomatic’, ‘at least as a general rule’.6 He acknowledged, however, 
that situations may arise where an act that occurs in one place has its consequences 
directly felt in another. It may be such that the consequences may be taken to 
constitute the wrong. The issue of where the tort takes place becomes debatable. 
                                                
2 28 USC §1350 (1988). 
3 [1994] 3 SCR 1022. 
4 Ibid [43]. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid [42]. 
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Transnational wrongs present an example of this. Territorial considerations may 
become less important.7 La Forest J suggested that the lex loci rule may not apply to 
cases of these kinds, but he did not elaborate on the point since the cases before him 
presented a different scenario. At another point, he was more specific in allowing an 
exception: ‘There may be room for exceptions but they would need to be very 
carefully defined.’8  
La Forest J explicitly rejected an exception in interprovincial cases (Major 
and Sopinka JJ dissenting on this point) but reserved the exception for international 
cases. This means that it might sometimes be appropriate to apply a law other than 
the lex loci to transnational and international torts. He wrote:  
I view the lex loci delicti rule as the governing law. However, because a 
rigid rule on the international level could give rise to injustice, in certain 
circumstances, I am not averse to retaining a discretion in the court to 
apply our own law to deal with such circumstances. I can, however, 
imagine few cases where this would be necessary.9  
The rationale for the interprovincial/international dichotomy remains largely 
unclear. The exact limits of the exception in international cases equally remain 
undefined although La Forest J’s decision contains statements upon which some 
projections can be made. His reference to “our own law” in the above passage, for 
instance, suggests that he had in mind the application of the lex fori as an exception 
to the lex loci. This reference to the lex fori, however, seems relatively casual, with the 
result that it is not clear whether La Forest J would not allow some other law, other 
than the lex fori, to perform the exceptional role in appropriate circumstances. The 
development of the jurisprudence has not provided opportunities for this to be 
elaborated.  
In Hanlan v Sernesky,10 the Ontario Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of 
the Ontario Superior Court applying the lex fori in an international case engaging 
Ontario and Minnesota. The reason for applying the lex fori was not because the case 
was litigated in Ontario. The Court stated that Tolofson allows ‘a discretion to apply 
the lex fori in circumstances where the lex loci delicti rule would work an injustice.’11 
While what amounts to injustice informing the application of a law other than the lex 
loci remains unclear, the law applied in the case, the lex fori, happened to be the 
personal law of the parties. Injustice would result in applying the lex loci in the case 
because (1) the parties were both Ontario residents; (2) the contract of insurance was 
issued in Ontario; (3) the only connection between the case and Ontario was the 
occurrence of the accident; (4) the consequences of the accident were directly felt in 
Ontario; and (5) Minnesota law – the lex loci – did not allow claims of the nature in 
question in the case.12 Craig Forcese has pointed out that the consideration of the 
difference in the law of the two jurisdictions went against the views of La Forest J 
who stated that difference in the laws of the two jurisdictions does not amount to 
injustice.13 While this is accurate, the other factors present in Hanlan might have 
                                                
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid [45]. 
9 Ibid [49].  
10 (1998), 38 OR (3d) 479. 
11 Ibid 479. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Craig Forcese, ‘Deterring “Militarized Commerce”: The Prospects of Liability for “Privatized” 
Human Rights Abuses’ (2000) 31 Ottawa L Rev 173, 208. 
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contributed to giving different shading to the difference in the laws of the two 
jurisdictions.  
What was applied in Hanlan was essentially the personal law of the parties. 
The application of the personal law is not new in Canada. It is endorsed by Article 
3126 of the Civil Code of Quebec14 as an exception to the general rule in favour of 
the lex loci in interprovincial cases established in the Code. The second paragraph of 
the Code states that ‘[i]n any case where the person who committed the injurious act 
and the victim have their domiciles or residences in the same country, the law of that 
country applies.’15 Since La Forest J did not declare the lex loci rule constitutionally 
mandated, this exception is preserved in Quebec, and other provinces might enact 
similar legislation.  
It has been suggested that ‘where the lex loci is the product of a despotic 
regime unacceptable to a democratic society’, some other law may be applied.16 This 
suggestion should be rejected. The criteria for declaring a regime despotic are highly 
political. Courts should not get embroiled in such political questions. Such 
pronouncements very easily amount to an indefensible verdict on the integrity of a 
foreign legal system and could very easily be seen as imperialistic. It is better to focus 
the inquiry on whether justice can be served if the foreign law is applied, regardless 
of whether the foreign regime is believed to be despotic or democratic. 
While La Forest J left undefined the circumstances when an exception is 
warranted in international cases, Article 3081 of the CCQ expressly provides the 
situation when an exception is warranted: ‘The provisions of the law of a foreign 
country do not apply if their application would be manifestly inconsistent with public 
order as understood in international relations.’ The expression ‘public order as 
understood in international relations’ may be understood as meaning more than the 
concept of ‘ordre public’ found in civil law countries as well as the concept of ‘public 
policy’ found in common law countries, under which a court will not apply foreign 
law where the foreign law would offend some fundamental values of the forum.17 
This is because of the expression’s reference to international relations. Emmanueli 
has opined that ‘Quebec public order, for the purposes of private international law, 
encompasses principles and values of fundamental importance to Quebec society’, 
which ‘principles are often anchored in international texts,’ and are found in the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms as well as in the Quebec Charter of 
Human Rights and Freedoms.18 Talpis and Castel have similarly suggested that in 
qualifying the term public order with the term ‘manifestly’ and the expression ‘as 
                                                
14 SQ 1991, c 64 (CCQ). 
15 The first paragraph of the Code states: ‘The obligation to make reparation for injury caused is 
governed by the law of the country where the injurious act occurred. However, if the injury appeared 
in another country, the law of the latter country is applicable if the person who committed the 
injurious act should have foreseen that the damage would occur.’ Thus in international cases, the 
application of the lex loci is conditional upon the wrongdoer being in a position that he ought to have 
foreseen that damage would occur from his/her conduct. 
16 Forcese (n 13). 
17 The major difference between ‘ordre public’ and ‘public policy’ is that ordre public contemplates ‘not so 
much the contents of the foreign law… as its effects.’ JA Talpis & J-G Castel, ‘Interpreting the Rules 
of Private International Law’ in Reform of the Civil Code, vol 5B: Private International Law, translated by 
Me Susan Altschul, (Barreau du Quebec and the Chambre des notaires du Quebec 1993) 1, 14. See 
also James Yap, ‘Corporate Civil Liability for War Crimes in Canadian Courts: Lessons from Bil’in 
(Village Council) v. Green Park International Ltd.’ (2010) 8 JICJ 631, 636. 
18 Claude Emanuelli, Droit international prive que be cois (2nd edn, Wilson & Lafleur 2006) 253 (cited in 
Yap, ibid). 
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understood in international relations’, Quebec Parliament aimed ‘to instill an 
internationalist attitude in the judge’.19 Quebec courts are therefore enjoined to look 
to international principles in determining whether an exception to the lex loci rule 
should be made.  
The meaning of ‘manifestly inconsistent with public order as understood in 
international relations’ was considered by the Superior Court of Quebec in Bil’In 
(Village Council) v Green Park International Inc,20 a case relating to the Israeli occupation 
of the West Bank. Two Montreal corporations and their sole director were sued for 
their alleged involvement in the development of dense residential housing in the 
West Bank. The plaintiffs alleged that by forcefully transferring its population from 
territory it occupied in the West Bank, the defendants assisted Israel in violating the 
Fourth Geneva Convention,21 the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court,22 Canadian law and Quebec law.  
In response to a forum non conveniens motion, the plaintiffs argued that the law 
applicable in the West Bank was ‘manifestly inconsistent with public order as 
understood in international relations’ because the High Court of Justice of Israel did 
not recognize the application of the Fourth Geneva Convention.23 The Fourth 
Geneva Convention provides, under Article 49(6), that an occupying State may not 
‘transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies’. What the 
plaintiffs were essentially saying was that their claims would be non-justiciable in 
Israel because Israel did not accept that its forceful transfer of civilian population in 
the West Bank was a violation of international law. Cullen JSC of the Superior Court 
of Quebec did not find convincing evidence demonstrating that the High Court of 
Justice of Israel would refuse to hear the action on the basis that Article 49(6) of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention was non-justiciable in Israel.24 Without explaining the 
meaning of the expression ‘manifestly inconsistent with public order as understood 
in international relations’, however, Cullen JSC stated that, like Canadian courts, 
Israeli courts do not apply international law unless they have been incorporated into 
Israeli domestic law and that this requirement is not ‘manifestly inconsistent with 
public order as understood in international relations’.25 He found, or rather 
speculated, that the Israeli High Court of Justice had not applied Article 49(6) of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention, not because of its ‘unwillingness’ to do so, but either 
because it was unnecessary to do so or because the court did not regard it as 
customary international law and that it was not part of Israeli domestic law.26 He 
noted that the fact that Canada had domestically implemented the Fourth Geneva 
Convention did not lead to the conclusion that the application of the West Bank law 
would produce a result ‘manifestly inconsistent with public order as understood in 
international relations’.27 He also noted that Canadian courts would, in general, not 
hear a case that merely raised a ‘hypothetical or abstract’ question, and that this 
requirement is not ‘manifestly inconsistent with public order as understood in 
                                                
19 Talpis & Castel (n 17) 14.  
20 2009 QCCS 4151 (CanLII). 
21 Convention Relative to the Protection of Civil Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 
287. 
22 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 3, 37 ILM 999 (1998). 
23 Bil’In (n 20) [239-40]. 
24 Ibid [265]. 
25 Ibid [274-5]. 
26 Ibid [288]. 
27 Ibid [289]. 
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international relations’.28 On appeal, the Quebec Court of Appeal did not address the 
meaning of ‘manifestly inconsistent with public order as understood in international 
relations’ even though the plaintiff renewed their argument that the non-justiciability 
of their claims in Israel was ‘manifestly inconsistent with public order as understood 
in international relations’. Forget JA limited his analysis to Cullen JSC’s finding that 
the plaintiffs’ claim was justiciable in Israel. He refrained from interfering with this 
finding.29 
It is not clear whether Cullen JSC would have held that the West Bank law 
was ‘manifestly inconsistent with public order as understood in international 
relations’ had he found that Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention was an 
articulation of customary international law and that Israeli courts would not apply it. 
It is submitted that there is no better manifestation of inconsistency with public 
order as understood in international relations than a refusal to apply customary 
international law. It is further suggested that a law would be deemed ‘manifestly 
inconsistent with public order as understood in international relations’ if it offends 
some core values held by the international community, for example, if it fails to 
recognize gender or racial equality. 
Cullen JSC stressed that Article 3081 of the CCQ ‘does not purport to 
invalidate “acts”, but to deny the application of the “provisions of the law” of a 
foreign country.’30 He rightly pointed out that the Article targets the ‘result’ of 
applying the provisions of the foreign law.31 Thereafter he stated that the plaintiffs 
were not contesting the application of any ‘provisions of the law’ of Israel, but 
‘prospectively oppose what they presume would be a legally unjustifiable refusal by 
the [Israeli High Court of Justice] to apply Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention on which the Action is based.’32 There is no real difference between 
what the plaintiffs were doing and what Cullen JSC thought they should be doing. 
The target of Article 3081 is the effect of applying the provisions of a foreign law, not 
the provisions of the foreign law themselves. If Israeli courts would apply Israeli law, 
they would by effect refuse to apply Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention 
which was not part of Israeli domestic law. Therefore attacking the prospective 
refusal of Israeli courts to apply Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention was 
in essence an attack on the effect of applying Israeli law. What was left for Cullen 
JSC to determine was whether such effect was ‘manifestly inconsistent with public 
order as understood in international relations’. 
In Tolofson, La Forest J noted that it was from out of international law that 
private international law developed.33 On the international plane, the ‘underlying 
reality’ is the territoriality principle.34 Behind the territoriality principle dwells the 
doctrine of comity. Both the territoriality principle and the doctrine of comity, 
Jennifer Orange has pointed out, are international legal concepts that have stood 
with relatively few exceptions, one of those exceptions being the norm of jus cogens.35 
                                                
28 Ibid [267]. 
29 Yassin v Green Park International Inc, 2010 QCCA 1455 (CanLII). 
30 Bil’in (n 20) [296]. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid [297-8]. 
33 Tolofson (n 3) [35]. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Jennifer A Orange, ‘Torture, Tort Choice of Law and Tolofson’ in Craig Scott, ed, Torture as Tort: 
Comparative Perspectives on the Development of Transnational Human Rights Litigation (Hart Publishing 2001) 
291, 301-2. 
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Jus cogens refers to norms of such degree of inviolability and primordial importance 
that they are regarded as peremptory and non-derogable.36 Such norms are found 
mostly in the realm of international human rights law. They reflect the intimate and 
sincerest values of the international society. It is in the interest of all States that 
whenever they are violated, remedy must be provided.  
The need to provide of remedies to redress violations of jus cogens may affect 
the choice of law decision. Citing Cheshire, FA Mann argues, albeit in the context of 
contract, that ‘“it is elementary common sense “that the applicability of rules of jus 
cogens” must be decided independently of the expressed intention of the parties or, to 
put it another way, that the law by which they are to be governed cannot be a matter 
of free will.’37  
If in contract, where parties are permitted to choose the governing law of 
their transaction, jus cogens norms cannot be overridden by exercise of free will, there 
is no reason why the application of jus cogens norms can be supplanted by any court-
formulated tort choice of law rule where those norms are germane to the conduct in 
question. To overlook such norms in the choice of applicable tort law would be to 
delegitimize the inclusion of those norms in domestic statutes such as Article 3081 of 
the CCQ that proscribes the application of a foreign law that is ‘manifestly 
inconsistent with public order as understood in international relations’.  
La Forest J hinted at the reasonableness of supplanting the lex loci where 
some ‘overriding norm’ is implicated. He wrote: ‘The underlying postulate of public 
international law is that generally each state has jurisdiction to make and apply law 
within its territorial limits. Absent a breach of some overriding norm, other states as a 
matter of “comity” will ordinarily respect such actions and are hesitant to interfere 
with what another state chooses to do with those limits.’38 The term ‘overriding 
norm’ speaks undoubtedly to a category of norm equivalent or comparable to jus 
cogens or to customary international law generally. This view of comity reflects the 
new insight that the Supreme Court of Canada has progressively added to our 
understanding of comity. In Morguard Investments Ltd v De Savoye, the court regarded 
comity as the ‘informing principle’ stimulating Canadian private international law.39 
In R v Hape the court stated that ‘[w]hen cited by the courts, comity is more a 
principle of interpretation than a rule of law, because it does not arise from formal 
obligations.’40 Here the court considered the question of the extraterritorial 
applicability of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.41 While it gave 
considerable weight to the doctrine of comity, it added one interesting and 
remarkable restriction: ‘the need to uphold international law may trump the principle 
of comity.’42 In Khadr v Canada reiterated its holding in Hape:  
[C]omity cannot be used to justify Canadian participation in activities of 
a foreign state or its agents that are contrary to Canada’s international 
obligations. It was held [in Hape] that the deference required by the 
principle of comity ‘ends where clear violations of international law and 
                                                
36 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 8 ILM 679 (1969), Article 53. 
37 FA Mann, ‘The Proper Law of the Contract’ (1950) 3:1 Int’l LQ 60, 62.  
38 Tolofson (n 3) [36] (italics added for emphasis). 
39 [1990] 3 SCR 1077 [29]. 
40 [2007] 2 SCR 292 [47]. 
41 Constitution Act 1982, Part I, (29 March 1982). 
42 Hape (n 40) [52]. 
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fundamental human rights begin’.43 
The importance of the above proclamations must be taken to extend beyond the 
application of the Charter, to any dispute where international comity is at issue, such 
as the application of the rules of private international law, namely, choice of law. 
Where ‘clear violations of international law and fundamental human rights’ are the 
subject of a dispute, courts must accord comity a back seat.  
In formulating the lex loci rule, La Forest J referred to The Hague Convention 
on Traffic Accidents44 as a reflection of State practice in favour of the application of 
the lex loci. State practice was thus so important to La Forest J that its existence in 
favour of the lex loci provided added support for the adoption of the lex loci rule. This 
goes to show that the requirement that the norm have an ‘overriding’ status in the 
sense of jus cogens is even too high a demand. 
It follows from the foregoing analyses that in determining the applicable law 
in international tort cases, it is proper for Canadian courts to look at the status of the 
violated norm in international law. If the violated norm is an ‘overriding norm’, it 
would offend neither the territoriality principle nor the doctrine of comity to apply 
the law that most adequately responds to the nature of that norm. That law may be 
the lex fori; it may be the lex loci. It may even be some other law provided there is 
some connection between that law’s forum and the action or the parties.  
It is true that customary international law may not contain concrete elements 
necessary for determining liability in specific cases involving violations of customary 
international law. As Beth Stephens et al have observed, the ‘international system 
relies on domestic courts to provide the rules necessary to resolve complex claims. 
International law does not provide the level of detail necessary to resolve the many 
ancillary issues triggered by domestic litigation.’45 Customary international law may 
determine the issue of actionability where that is well settled in customary 
international law while some other law may determine liability, damages, etc. The 
practical effect is that any law that would reject the application of customary 
international law would not be applied regardless of whether or not it is the lex loci. 
The existence of treaties regulating the legal field presented by a certain international 
case, especially where those treaties have been extensively ratified, may guide the 
choice of law determination. This may not result in the application of any specific 
treaty as the domestic application of treaty law is governed by domestic law. But it 
points to the need to identify which of the laws of the competing forums most 
closely reflects the contents of the relevant treaties. The process of identifying this 
may not be easy, but neither is any process in private international law. However, in 
the context of international human rights, it may not be too difficult to identify 
which country’s law most closely reflects the contents of international human rights 
treaties. A look at which country has most ratified and domesticated the relevant 
treaties would be a useful place to start. In sum, therefore, Canadian choice of law 
rule contains reasonable flexibility to fairly address violations of international 
fundamental norms. 
 
III. THE UNITED STATES 
                                                
43 [2008] 2 SCR 125. 
44 26 October 1968, 8 ILM 34 (1969). 
45 Beth Stephens et al, International Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, (2nd edn, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 2008) 36-37. 
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US choice of law jurisprudence has considered a panoply of theories over a span 
of a century. Broadly speaking, the courts have considered the lex fori, the doctrine of 
comity, the lex loci, the vested rights theory, the rule in Babcock v Jackson,46 
governmental interest analysis and its variant the comparative impairment approach, 
the Restatement (Second) of the Conflict of Laws,47 the better law theory, and hybrid 
approaches. This assortment of approaches emerged as a result of the influence of 
legal commentators48 and the fact that every state of the US is free to create its own 
choice of law rules – the US Supreme Court has not thought it wise to standardize 
the rules but believes that choice of law is better left to individual states to decide.49 
This is in keeping with the nature of private international law, whereby each unit of a 
federating state is regarded as a distinct legal system. At the same time, the 
assortment of approaches reflects the inherent difficulty of choosing a substantive 
rule to govern choice of law determinations. Lawyers, judges and litigants are left 
with ‘Hobson’s choice’ as to which of the rival themes and policies to choose.50 
Benjamin Cardozo bemoaned this difficulty when he referred to choice of law as 
‘one of the most baffling subjects of legal science’,51 a view re-echoed in England by 
Lord Denning when he described tort choice of law as ‘one of the most vexed 
questions in conflict of laws.’52 
A detailed description of the theories mentioned above is impossible within 
the limits of a law review article. It should suffice to say that, generally, US courts 
take a largely functional approach to choice of law. They seek to find the law that 
would best account for the purposes behind the laws of the state most likely to bear 
the consequences of the choice. This approach emphasizes the state’s interests in the 
case much more than it looks at the geographical location of the harm-causing event, 
which is the gravamen of the operative rule in Canada. The rule in Babcock, for 
instance, propounds that the substantive rights of the parties are to be governed by 
the law of the forum having the most significant interest in the consequences of the 
litigation. Governmental interests analysis sees conflict of laws essentially as a 
conflict of interests between the competing states and aims to recognize and respect 
the policy interests of a jurisdiction in a particular issue, requiring the court to 
consider the governmental policy underlying the laws of its forum.53  The 
Restatement (Second) laid down that ‘the rights and liabilities of the parties with 
respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state which, as to 
that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties.’54 
And the better law theory calls for the consideration of five principles in the 
determination of the applicable law: the predictability of results, the maintenance of 
                                                
46 12 NY 2d 473, 481-482 (1963). 
47 Rest 2d Conf (1968) (Restatement (Second)). 
48 Friedrich Juenger, ‘Choice of Law in Interstate Torts’ (1969) 118 U Penn L Rev 202, 203 (arguing 
that the ‘conflicts revolution was motivated by the pronunciamentos of legal scholars’ like Cook, 
Lorenzen, Yntema, Cavers, Ehrenzweig and Currie). 
49 The court has, however, through its interpretation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause placed 
‘modest restrictions’ on the freedom of a state court to adopt choice of law principles. See Michael E 
Solimine, ‘The Impact of Babcock v. Jackson: An Empirical Note’ (1993) 56 Alb L Rev 773, 776, 
footnote 20 (citing Philips Petroleum Co v Shutts, 472 US 797, 818 (1985)). 
50 Alan Reed, ‘The Anglo-American Revolution in Tort Choice of Law Principles: Paradigm Shift or 
Pandora’s Box?’ (2001) 18:3 Ariz J Int’l & Comp L 867, 879. 
51 Benjamin N Cardozo, The Paradoxes of Legal Science (Columbia University Press 1928) 67.  
52 Boys v Chaplin [1968] 2 QB 1. 
53 Brainerd Currie, ‘Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws’ (1959) 8:2 Duke LJ 
171, 190. 
54 Restatement (Second) (n 47) s 145. 
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interstate and international order, the simplification of the judicial task, the 
advancement of the forum’s governmental interests, and the application of the better 
rule of law.55 The factors are in no particular order, but the weight they carry 
depends on the legal field involved.56  
It can be said that US choice of law methodology is more substantively 
oriented than Canada’s in that with the exception of the lex fori and the lex loci that 
are still applied in some states,57 the other approaches look more or less to the 
substance of the competing laws. Jurisdiction-selecting rules are overlooked in 
favour of result-oriented approaches that look at the insides of the competing laws. 
However, of all the theories, it is the Restatement (Second) and the better law theory 
that are potentially oriented towards addressing international interests. The extent of 
their orientation is considered below. But it is in the context of the Alien Tort 
Statute that US courts have looked to international law in the resolution of disputes 
between private parties. What is quite significant about the courts’ jurisprudence is 
that the courts have not relied on any of the above-mentioned theories in their 
reference to international law when applying the statute. ATS jurisprudence is 
therefore considered as a third possible basis for the consideration of international 
policies in US tort choice of law. 
 
A. The Restatement (Second) 
Choice of law determination under the Restatement is based on an analysis of 
contacts or relationships. It ‘involves a two-step process of identifying the relevant 
“contacts”’ between the dispute and the respective states and then weighing the 
significance of those contacts or relationships with respect to the particular issue in 
order to discover ‘the state with the most significant relationships.’58 As one scholar 
has loosely put it, it is ‘a process of balancing relationships in order to identify the 
most significant one.’59 
The most relevant parts of the Restatement (Second) are sections 6 and 145. 
Section 6 provides: 
1. A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory 
directive of its own state on choice of law. 
2. When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of 
the applicable rule of law include: 
a. the needs of the interstate and international systems 
b. the relevant policies of the forum, 
c. the relevant policies of the other interested states and the relative 
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interests of those states in the determination of the particular 
issue, 
d. the protection of justified expectations, 
e. the basic policies underlying the particular field of law, 
f. certainty, predictability, uniformity of results, and 
g. ease in the determination and application of the law to be 
applied. 
Section 145 sets out the relevant contacts: 
1. The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort 
are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to 
that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and 
the parties under the principles stated in section 6. 
2. Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of 
section 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include: 
a. the place where the injury occurred, 
b. the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred, 
c. the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and 
place of business of the parties, and 
d. the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties 
concerned. 
The Restatement (Second) thus adopts an issue-by-issue analytical methodology. 
It adopts a functional approach to the choice of applicable law. While section 6 
contains general policy-considerations, section 145 contains detailed contact 
considerations that are intended to effectuate the policies contained in section 6. 
Twenty-four states have adopted the Restatement (Second)60 although they diverge in 
their interpretation of the ‘most significant relationship’.61 
The relevant of part of the Restatement is section 6(2)(a) which provides that 
in the absence of a statutory directive concerning the applicable law, a court should 
consider ‘the needs of the interstate and international systems’. The first step 
therefore is for the court to examine the Restatement to see whether any specific 
section stipulates the application of the law of a particular state to the issue in 
dispute. It is only in the absence of such stipulation that the court can venture into a 
section 6 analysis to determine which state has the most significant relationship with 
the dispute.  
It is remarkable that the ‘needs of the interstate and international systems’ is 
listed as the first factor to be considered. A comment attached to section 6 gives 
insight into the relevance of this factor. The comment states that the most important 
function of choice-of-law rules is probably to make ‘the interstate and international 
system work well.’62 The comment states that choice-of-law rules should promote 
‘harmonious relations between states’ and ‘facilitate commercial intercourse between 
them.’63 It was the belief of the drafters of the Restatement that if courts develop 
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choice of law rules that meet these needs, other states will be disposed to adopt 
them, thus ensuring ‘the values of certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result.’64 
While the Restatement urges a consideration of the needs of the interstate 
and international systems, it fails to mention the types of such needs. Subject to due 
process constraints and the provisions of some treaties, US courts are free to pursue 
local policies at the expense of the policies of the international community.65 The 
pursuit of local policies in international cases often creates frictions between the US 
and other States. The task of the court considering section 6(2)(a) of the Restatement 
is to pursue policies that will reduce friction and promote a spirit of cooperation 
among States. Such an international policy does not necessarily reject the application 
of forum law, but urges a consideration of the application of some other law if that 
law will best serve the overall interest of the international community. Cases where 
international considerations would weigh against the application of forum law have 
been said to include cases where the cause of action occurred in a foreign State but 
the injured party has access to US courts.66 The legitimate expectations of the parties 
would be that the law of the foreign State where the events took place would apply. 
But since the interests of the international community are what is at issue, such 
interests would be engaged not only where the events occurred in another State, but 
also where the alleged violated norm is an international fundamental norm, such as 
the prohibition against torture.  
 
B. The Better Law Theory 
Robert Leflar, who propounded the theory, believes that instead of weighing 
interests or contacts, courts should consider a set of ‘choice-influencing 
considerations’67 in their choice of law analysis. This approach calls for the 
consideration of five principles in the determination of the applicable law: (1) the 
predictability of results, (2) the maintenance of interstate and international order, (3) 
the simplification of the judicial task, (4) the advancement of the forum’s 
governmental interests, and (5) the application of the better rule of law.68 The factors 
are in no particular order, but the weight each carries depends on the legal field 
involved.69 What Leflar sought to do was to reduce the multitude of factors found in 
the conflicts literature to a ‘manageable number and identity.’70  
The most distinctive feature of Leflar’s theory seems to be the fifth factor 
since the other factors feature in one form or the other in the Restatement (Second) and 
in Currie’s governmental interests analysis. However, it is broader than governmental 
interests in that while the fourth factor speaks to the interests of the forum 
government, the second factor directs courts to consider the conflicting interests of 
other states.71 In Leflar’s words, ‘[a] state’s governmental interests in the choice-of-
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law sense need not coincide with its rules of local law, especially if the local rules, 
whether statutory or judge-made, are old or out of tune with the times.’72 Thus 
governmental interests are a less salient factor in Leflar’s world than in Currie’s 
world.  
The ‘most controversial’ of these factors is the fifth factor – the better rule of 
law.73 According to Kay, this factor was intended to give conflicts judges ‘the 
freedom to ignore disfavored local law that would bind them in domestic cases.’74 By 
the better rule of law, Leflar intends ‘a weighing of the quality of the rules of law’ in 
competition.75 Thus, a judge that find’s forum law “anachronistic, behind the times, 
[or] ‘a drag on the coat tails of civilization’,” would apply foreign law.76 Leflar 
distinguishes the better law theory from the vested rights approach in that whereas 
vested rights entails a choice between states, the better law theory calls for a choice 
between laws.77 He also distinguishes the better law from individualized justice, 
arguing that whereas individualized justice strives for the ‘better party’, the better law 
strives for the better rule of law.78 ‘A choice made between competing rules of law’, 
he argues, ‘is more impersonal, less subjective, more in keeping with the traditional 
law-discovering functions of a common-law court [than one based on individualized 
justice].’79 One can also distinguish better law from governmental interests by saying 
that governmental interests looks for the state with better interests, thus, a choice 
between competing interests, while better law looks for the state with the better rule 
of law. New Hampshire was the first state to adopt the theory.80 Four other states 
have since joined: Arkansas, Minnesota, Rhode Island and Wisconsin.81 A few other 
states have cited Leflar approvingly without quite adopting it while some have 
mingled it with other approaches.82 
The factor relevant to our purpose is the second factor: ‘the maintenance of 
interstate and international order’. This factor is identical with section 6(2)(a) of the 
Restatement (Second). According to McDougal, Leflar ‘envisions this consideration 
as primarily a counterbalance to the tendency of courts to want to apply forum law 
to resolve choice-of-law cases.’83 Thus, the same arguments supporting the 
Restatement apply fully to Leflar’s theory. 
 
C. The ATS  
 
The ATS grants Federal District Courts original jurisdiction to hear and determine 
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‘any civil action [brought] by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the 
law of nations or a treaty of the United States’.84 The reference to the law of nations 
is arguably the main reason for the courts’ recourse to international law. 
In Abdullahi v Pfizer,85 a group of Nigerian plaintiffs brought action on behalf 
of Nigerian children. An unprecedented epidemic of bacteria meningitis, cholera and 
measles had occurred in Kano State in 1996. US Pharmaceutical company Pfizer 
requested and received approval from the Nigerian government to administer its new 
antibiotic Trovan to children suffering from bacterial meningitis. At the time, 
although Trovan had been tested on adults, it had not yet received the approval of 
the US Federal Drug Administration. Many of the children died after receiving the 
treatment while many others suffered various ailments. In 2001 a group of 
parents/guardians filed a class action suit in the US on behalf of those children. They 
alleged, among other things, that Pfizer failed to obtain informed consent for the 
treatment and to inform the parents of the children of the possible risks associated 
with the drugs. Writing for the majority of a divided Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals, Judge Parker applied customary international law to hold that non-
consensual drug tests provided a cause of action recognizable by the courts. He 
referred to various sources of international law expressing a norm against 
nonconsensual drug experimentation that was ‘sufficiently specific, universally 
accepted, and obligatory for courts to recognize a cause of action to enforce the 
norm’ under the ATS.86  
It is clear that it was the nature of the norm allegedly violated that informed 
Parker J’s application of customary international law. The minority’s dissent 
concerned only the sufficiency of the basis upon which the court could hold that 
nonconsensual drug experimentation was a violation of customary international law. 
Discussing that issue is beyond the scope of this article. 
In Presbyterian Church v Talisman,87 the allegation was that Talisman Energy Inc 
(a Canadian corporation operating in Southern Sudan) aided and abetted the 
Sudanese military in an ethnic cleansing that occurred in Southern Sudan in the 
1990s. The issue was whether customary international law or US law should govern 
the determination of the proper mens rea for aiding and abetting liability. The Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the scope of ATS violations should be determined 
by reference to international law.88 It looked to customary international law and 
found in the numerous decisions of international tribunals as well as the statutes 
establishing them the existence of a rule of customary international law governing 
aiding and abetting liability. It found that the applicable standard for aiding and 
abetting liability required both that the defendant knew that his conduct would assist 
in the commission of the crime (knowledge) and that the defendant intended to give 
such assistance (purpose). This was contrary to the standard under US federal 
common law, which required only knowledge.  
Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum89 was another landmark ATS choice of law 
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decision. Some Nigerian plaintiffs claimed that Royal Dutch Petroleum Company (a 
Dutch corporation) and Shell Transport and Trading Company (a British 
corporation), acting through their Nigerian subsidiary, Shell Petroleum Development 
Company of Nigeria, aided and abetted the Nigerian government in committing acts 
against the plaintiffs that amounted to violations of the law of nations. They sought 
damages under the ATS. As the Second Circuit put it, the action would proceed only 
if the ATS provides jurisdiction over tort actions brought against corporations for 
violations of customary international law.90 The critical issue then was where to look 
for the answer to the question of whether the ATS provides jurisdiction over tort 
actions brought against corporations for violations of customary international law. Is 
it in US domestic law or in customary international law?  
Writing for the court, Judge Cabranes stated:  
[T]he substantive law that determines our jurisdiction under the ATS 
is neither the domestic law of the United States nor the domestic law 
of any other country.  By conferring subject matter jurisdiction over a 
limited number of offenses defined by international law, the ATS 
requires federal courts to look beyond rules of domestic law – 
however well-established they may be – to examine the specific and 
universally accepted rules that the nations of the world treat as 
binding in their dealings with one another.91 
Having determined that the answer lay in international law, the court then 
examined international law to see whether corporations could be held liable for 
violations of customary international law. After reviewing the evolution of 
international law since Nuremberg, the court noted that while States are no longer 
the only subject of international law, the scope of other subjects has been limited to 
natural persons.92 An appeal to the US Supreme Court is still pending at the time of 
this writing. 
In Flomo v Firestone,93 children at the defendant’s rubber plantation in 
Liberia claimed that they worked in such hazardous conditions that the work violated 
customary international law. The Seventh Circuit found for the defendant on the 
basis that the conditions under which the children allegedly worked did not provide a 
sufficient basis to deduce that customary international law had been violated, but 
stated that ‘corporate liability is possible’ under the ATS.94 Judge Posner found ‘the 
factual premise of the majority opinion in the Kiobel case … incorrect.’95 In his view, 
‘[i]nternational law imposes substantive obligations and the individual nations decide 
how to enforce them.’96  
In Doe v ExxonMobil,97 villagers of Aceh, Indonesia, alleged that ExxonMobil 
and its Indonesian subsidiary were responsible for killings, torture and other human 
rights abuses committed by the Indonesian military. In a 2–1 majority decision, the 
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District of Columbia Circuit explicitly rejected the Kiobel premise, stating that ‘neither 
the text, history, nor purpose of the ATS supports corporate immunity for torts 
based on heinous conduct allegedly committed by its agents in violation of the law of 
nations.’98 The court stated that Kiobel ‘overlooks the key distinction between norms 
of conduct and remedies’, and opined that while international law provides the 
norms of conduct applicable in ATS cases, US domestic law governs the remedies.99 
Accordingly, it rejected the Second Circuit’s holding in Talisman that the applicable 
standard for aiding and abetting liability is governed by international law – that is, the 
existence of both knowledge and purpose. It was of the view that knowledge alone 
was, in accordance with US federal common law, sufficient for aiding and abetting 
liability.100 
And in a 7–4 majority opinion in Sarei v Rio Tinto,101 the Ninth Circuit held 
that claims of genocide and war crimes could proceed against Rio Tinto. It ‘agree[d] 
and concluded that international law extends the scope of liability for war crimes to 
all actors, including corporations’.102 The decision had six separate opinions. A 
dissent from Senior Judge Kleinfed, joined by Judges Bea and Ikuta, attacked the 
majority for creating ‘a new imperialism, entitling our court, and not the peoples of 
other countries, to make the law governing persons within those countries.’103 
Reacting to the decision, however, one scholar declared that ‘[t]his opinion reiterates 
that Kiobel is an outlier.’104 
Whether these courts’ findings regarding the state of customary international 
law were accurate is not the concern here. Indeed, some uncertainty still exists, for 
instance, as to the appropriate aiding and abetting liability standard in customary 
international law – the issue in both Talisman and Sarei. And regarding Kiobel, while it 
is generally believed that corporations have no international accountability, that 
belief is not based on customary international law. To say there is such a rule in 
customary international law is to ignore the process of customary international law-
making. While not the only route to customary international law, State practice 
remains the most significant route. The absence of State practice in favour of 
corporate accountability for violations of international law does not constitute 
evidence of the existence of customary international law to the contrary effect. 
Positive State practice demonstrating that prohibition is required. This means that a 
State that holds corporations liable for violations of customary international law is 
not thereby breaching its international law obligations. It is thus fair to say that 
customary international law is silent on the point. 
The purpose here, however, is to demonstrate that US choice of law 
jurisprudence recognizes the applicability of customary international law to address 
violations of international fundamental norms. Indeed, the US Supreme Court in 
Sosa v Alvarez Machain105 did affirm this when it decided that the ATS authorized the 
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recognition of causes of action that were ‘specific, universal, and obligatory.’106 In 
that case, though, the court rejected the norm of “arbitrary detention” as 
insufficiently universal as applied to the facts of that case.107  
And the specific point being made here is that where an issue is settled under 
customary international law, domestic common law must yield. Gib van Ert writes: 
If [customary] international law is truly to be the law of the land, … it 
must apply even when – perhaps especially when – domestic case law 
violates it. Unlike conventional international law, where constitutional 
concerns preclude judges from applying treaties directly in domestic 
law, there is no reason why judges should not take it upon themselves 
to assure the compliance of their decisions with custom. It is 
unbecoming of judges to uphold decisions of their courts that violate 
international law. Furthermore, it is incongruous for our courts to 
apply the presumption of conformity, which strives to bring 
legislation into harmony with international obligations, but not go 
further and assure that the results of their own adjudication also meet 
the requirements of international law.108 
 
Courts would therefore be breaching the international obligations of their States if 
they apply a standard different from that established in customary international law. 
 
IV. MAINTENANCE OF ORDER, PREDICTABILITY AND 
CERTAINTY IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The drafters of the Restatement (Second) emphasized ‘the values of certainty, 
predictability, and uniformity of result’ in the choice of applicable law.109 In Canada, 
order and certainty were ‘front and centre in Tolofson’.110 In Hunt v T & N Plc, the 
Supreme Court of Canada stated that the overriding principle of private international 
law is order and fairness, and that order comes before fairness and is ‘a precondition 
to justice.’111 While the significance of order and certainty may be more intensified in 
the context of federating units than in the relations among States, the significance of 
order in the international context is so much that: 
[i]f other states routinely applied their laws to activities taking place 
elsewhere, confusion would be the result.  In our modern world of easy 
travel and with the emergence of a global economic order, chaotic 
situations would often result if the principle of territorial jurisdiction were 
not, at least generally, respected.  Stability of transactions and well 
grounded legal expectations must be respected.  Many activities within one 
state necessarily have impact in another, but a multiplicity of competing 
exercises of state power in respect of such activities must be avoided.112 
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It is instructive that in laying down Tolofson, the Supreme Court of Canada turned to 
‘the underlying reality of the international legal order… to structure a rational and 
workable system of private international law.’113 As Orange notes, the underlying 
realities to which the Court turned were ‘the global economic order and related 
transactions’ and the reality of ‘easy travel’.114  
The need for certainty and predictability cannot be overstressed whether in 
the domestic context or in the international context. But the adamantine 
superimposition of order over fairness is too rigid and does not fully appreciate the 
reality of the international legal order. Professor Walker has argued: 
The “order” that is the “precondition to justice” need not come at 
the expense of “fairness” in the individual case. Decisional harmony 
would prevail as long as the choice between the lex loci and the other 
potentially applicable law was made through application of the same 
rule to the facts of the case (for example, whether a relationship 
between the parties indicated that it would be reasonable for their 
dispute to be governed by another potentially applicable law). 
“Order” is undermined only by the application of arbitrary choice of 
law rules that produce predictably inconsistent results. As has been 
observed, rules that arbitrarily dictate application of the lex fori 
exemplify this and they encourage manipulative tactics. Further, to 
achieve order it is not necessary to guarantee that every Canadian 
court decides the choice of law question in precisely the same way in 
any given case. No such certainty exists with respect to 
determinations in domestic cases. Rather, it is necessary only to 
establish a basis for confidence that the potential for variation is the 
same between courts within one province as it is between courts in 
different provinces.115 
In a highly integrated global economy, the task of private international law 
must be to apply the law that would best foster a safe environment for international 
business, bearing in mind not only the need to transnationally facilitate international 
business transactions but also the need to transnationally ensure that the businesses 
abide by safe environmental and human rights standards in the localities where they 
operate. The image of the international legal order presented in Tolofson was 
incomplete. On closer examination ‘it will emerge that as a normative matter, 
international law places ever greater value on protecting individual human rights, but 
also that, as an institutional reality, the systems set up to deal with human rights 
issues do not effectively address the needs of their constituents.’116 The Supreme 
Court of Canada did not recognize that the benefits of economic globalization have 
been in the hands of a few – the big corporations and the few wealthy States and 
individuals. Developing countries live in a different reality, with little or no power to 
confront back the situations that confront them. This reality should be seen as an 
important feature of the cause of action, thus as an important factor in choice of law 
determinations in international cases. It is therefore with a sense of agreement that 
one must view the following critique of Tolofson: ‘Choice of law issues do not seek to 
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interrupt the adjudicative process or the effort to reach a fair disposition of the 
claim, but rather to enhance the justice of the result by enabling the court to give 
effect to an important feature of the context in which the cause of action arose.’117  
There may be need to create different choice of law rules for different types 
of torts. There is no compelling reason to have only a single theory that would 
govern all types of torts, subject to a so-called ‘flexible exception’.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
As noted early on, ‘the smooth functioning of the interstate and international 
systems in private law matters should be the basic consideration in the decision of 
every choice of law case.’118 While the jurisdictions examined here do not have tort 
choice of law rules tailored to address violations of international fundamental norms, 
the Canadian approach in particular contains reasonable flexibility to address such 
cases if only Canadian courts take a functional approach to choice of law. In the case 
of the US, the specific language of the ATS makes resort to international law almost 
unavoidable. But in States where customary international law is part of the law of the 
land, the absence of specific statutory reference to international law cannot bar the 
application of customary international law where the norms allegedly violated are 
international fundamental norms. Granted that international law does not provide 
with specificity the substantive issues that arise in the litigation of norm violations, it 
is sufficient that the substantive violation of the norm be prohibited by well-
established principles of international law. Moreover, if the universal condemnation 
of a norm violation is a key factor justifying the assumption of jurisdiction in a 
particular case, such as under the ATS, there is no reason why choice of law theory 
applicable to those disputes should not point to a law that best promotes those 
values. The goal of choice of law should be to advance the prohibition of the 
violations. One merit of this approach is that because of the overriding international 
interest in the violation, it would be difficult for either party to complain that looking 
to international standards would produce an unfair result. This approach has the 
merit of forum-neutrality.  
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